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2Abstract20
Planning defined as the predetermination of a sequence of actions towards some goal is crucial21
for complex problem solving. To shed light on the evolution of executive functions, we22
investigated the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of planning. Therefore, we presented all23
four great apes species (N=12) as well as 4- and 5-year-old human preschoolers (N=24) with a24
vertical maze task. To gain a reward placed on the uppermost level of the maze, subjects had to25
move the reward to the bottom through open gaps situated at each level of the maze. In total,26
there were ten gaps located over three of the maze’s levels, and free passage through these27
gaps could be flexibly blocked using multiple traps. Due to the decision tree design of the maze,28
the subjects had to plan their actions depending on the trap configuration up to two steps ahead29
to successfully retrieve the reward. We found that (1) our measure of planning was negatively30
correlated with age in nonhuman apes, (2) younger apes as well as 5-year-old children planned31
their moves up to two steps ahead whereas 4-year-olds were limited to plan one step ahead,32
and (3) similar performance but different underlying limitations between apes and children.33
Namely, while all species of nonhuman apes were limited by a lack of motor control, human34
children exhibited a shortage in shifting their attention across a sequence of subgoals.35
36
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3Introduction40
While thinking about the next move, a good chess player not only needs to envision the41
potential outcomes of the current move but also to conceive of the sequences of multiple42
upcoming moves to determine what to do next (e.g. Charness, 1981). Even more mundane43
activities such as getting dressed or cooking a meal entail the planning of a number of actions44
before the execution of the first action. Accordingly, planning has been defined as the45
“predetermination of a course of action aimed at achieving some goal” (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-46
Roth, 1979).47
Such strategic planning is essential for complex problem solving. In the problem-solving48
literature, an important distinction has been made between forward search on the one hand and49
problem-reduction or “subgoaling” on the other hand (Willatts, 1989). In forward search, a50
sequence of actions or choices is tried out step by step, a strategy that has also been termed51
“generate and test” (Klahr, 1994). If an error occurs, an alternative sequence of actions or52
choices is tried out until eventually the goal is achieved. Remembering which sequence of53
actions has already been tested to avoid the previously made error can impose significant loads54
on memory. Willatts (1989) subdivides forward search into random and heuristic search. In55
random search each single decisions is made on a trial-and-error basis. In heuristic search (also56
termed "sighting", see Wellman, Fabricius, & Sophian, 1985), the efficiency of search is57
increased by the usage of fixed rules (i.e. heuristics like a proximity bias) that guide each single58
decision in a sequence.59
In contrast to forward search, subgoaling involves a means-ends analysis, that includes the60
identification of the discrepancy between the current state and the target state and the61
consideration of means to reduce this discrepancy (Willatts, 1989). In the simplest version, this62
has been called “hill climbing” (Klahr, 1994) in which the next move (but nothing beyond the63
4next move) is evaluated based on a goodness of fit approximation between the current state64
and the target state. Subgoaling goes beyond that: if the discrepancy between current state and65
goal state cannot be resolved immediately a sequence of subgoals is formulated. Achieving66
each of these subgoals in sequence will lead to the overarching goal. The key difference to67
forward search is that in subgoaling the sequence of subgoals is predetermined before the first68
step is made. Thus, subgoaling includes planning defined as the predetermination of a69
sequence of actions whereas forward search has been described as “planful” (Wellman et al.,70
1985), meaning that only the current move is taken into account.71
These strategies are not mutually exclusive and might be both at work in different situations72
(Willatts, 1989). Indeed, in some situations forward search might be more efficient than73
subgoaling (no or little information on task-specific means-end relations, limited number of74
alternatives), whereas in other settings subgoaling might be better suited for solving the problem75
(information on causal structure of the task available, large number of possible alternatives).76
Experimental studies on planning in children have mostly concentrated on navigation tasks77
(including maze and route planning tasks) and subgoaling tasks (like the Tower of Hanoi task).78
With regard to navigation tasks, a two-dimensional maze paradigm revealed that 4½- to 7-year-79
olds were able to plan the complete path through the maze before the first move (Gardner &80
Rogoff, 1990). Interestingly, younger children took longer pauses for planning than older ones, a81
finding that suggests that planning is more effortful for younger children. In route planning,82
children typically need to collect some items distributed in space. To find the shortest route and83
to avoid backtracking to locations that were previously visited the children needed to plan ahead84
before the first choice was made. Wellman et al. (1984) reported that 4- and 5-year-olds but not85
3-year-old children planned one step ahead. The search strategy of the 3-year-olds was best86
explained by a heuristic forward search strategy based on perceptual features of the search87
array (“sighting”). Additional experiments by Wellman and colleagues (summarized in Wellman88
5et al., 1985) revealed that the search behavior of preschoolers was best explained by a “mixture89
of sighting and planning, with planning growing in dominance over the preschool years”90
(Wellman et al., 1984). At the age of 5.5 years children’s search behavior could be solely91
ascribed to planning and not sighting. Similarly, Fabricius (1988) found that 5-year-olds were92
considering alternative routes before the first move and were spontaneously self-correcting93
errors. In contrast, 4-year-olds’ performance was best explained by a mixture of sighting (i.e. a94
proximity bias) and planning.95
With regard to subgoaling tasks, Klahr and Robinson (1981, see also Klahr 1994) showed that a96
majority of the 4-year-olds confronted with the Tower of Hanoi task reliably planned one step97
ahead (beyond the current move). Around one third of the 4-year-olds, however, did not plan98
ahead at all (i.e. they considered nothing beyond the current step). In contrast, all 5- and 6-year-99
olds planned at least one step, most of them even more steps ahead (between two and four100
steps).101
Non-human primates face various situations in their natural habitat in which this type of planning102
would also be advantageous. Activities that potentially involve planning are extractive foraging103
including (sequential) tool use (Sanz & Morgan, 2007), locomotion (Bard, 1995), hunting104
(Stanford, 1996) or nest building (van Casteren et al., 2012). Sanz and Morgan (2007) reported105
the usage of up to three tools used in a hierarchical sequence to open a beehive and to extract106
honey by wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Planning might be implicated in this example by107
predetermining the appropriate sequence of tools used. However, as we do not know the108
learning history of these wild chimpanzees, chaining of previously established behaviors109
provides an alternative account here (Epstein, Kirshnit, & Lanza, 1984).110
Therefore, experimental studies are needed to shed light on primates’ planning abilities. Mainly111
two types of studies have been used to investigate planning: navigation tasks (including route112
6planning and mazes) and serial ordering tasks. First of all, with regard to navigation tasks,113
Menzel (1973) pioneered the investigation of chimpanzees’ route planning in three-dimensional114
space (also known as the traveling salesman problem) by hiding 18 food items randomly in a115
large outdoor enclosure and analyzing their search behavior. Menzel showed that the116
chimpanzees remembered the location and type of most of the food rewards, but also that their117
routes were close to optimum with regard to the food acquisition rate. However, whether the118
apes were planning their route in advance or whether they, alternatively, were relying on a119
forward search strategy (cf. sighting, Wellman et al. 1985) cannot be distinguished from these120
data alone. In vervet monkeys there is evidence that the monkeys considered two further121
destinations beyond the current one when deciding for a route (Cramer, 1995; see also Gallistel122
& Cramer, 1996). However, a recent re-analysis of Menzel’s and Gallistel and Cramer’s data123
casts doubt on the planning hypothesis (Janson, 2013). Accordingly, the existing evidence for124
optimal spatial foraging in primates would not require multi-step route planning but might be125
consistent with a forward search strategy based on a proximity bias (in combination with a risk126
avoidance strategy).127
Considering mazes, Bingham (1929) presented chimpanzees with a three-dimensional maze128
apparatus and noted that the chimpanzees’ behavior involved “preparation for an effect in a129
location remote from that where concerted activities are initiated” (p.44). One of the earliest130
studies using two-dimensional mazes with great apes was conducted by Rensch and Döhl131
(1968) who presented Julia, a juvenile chimpanzee, with a large battery of mazes of increasing132
complexity. By means of a magnet the chimpanzee could move a metal ring (that was133
previously associated with a food reward) located underneath a Plexiglas panel through a maze.134
In the beginning of each trial, Julia had to decide between two maze arms by moving the metal135
ring down from an elevation (the elevation prevented her to correct her response). Julia learnt to136
inhibit the first move (up to a delay of 75 seconds) until she had tracked the path to the exit of137
7the maze. After having gained considerable experience (2215 trials), Julia reached a138
comparable performance to naïve biology students.139
More recently, Fragaszy and colleagues (2003; 2009; Pan et al., 2011) tested capuchin140
monkeys (Cebus apella) and chimpanzees with novel two-dimensional alley mazes presented141
on a computer screen. Fragaszy et al. (2003) for the first time systematically manipulated the142
maze complexity in terms of number of choice points and the directional properties of choices.143
Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys solved more mazes without error than expected by144
chance with chimpanzees generally performing better than capuchin monkeys. Chimpanzees145
and capuchin monkeys both corrected errors when they had chosen an incorrect path. The146
performance of the chimpanzees, in contrast to the monkeys, was independent of the number of147
choice points and directional properties of the maze. Therefore, the search behavior of most148
monkeys could be explained by a planful forward search based on the heuristic “direction of the149
path in relation to the goal”. In contrast, chimpanzees (and one monkey) seemed to consider150
upcoming choices in relation to the goal as indicated by smaller error rates towards the end of151
the maze. Fragaszy et al. (2003) concluded that chimpanzees and one monkey were able to152
consider one choice at a time “and sometimes more”. In the same vein, Iversen and Matsuzawa153
(2001) found that in a fingermaze task after training with mazes of gradually increasing154
complexity one chimpanzee could solve new mazes without making corrections in about 91% of155
the cases. However, when the two paths leading to the target differed in length the chimpanzee156
performance dropped to 53%. Thus, the map-reading ability of the chimpanzee in this task was157
limited by a preference for the shortest path. Most of these maze studies either involved158
extensive training and/or a shaping procedure that involved a gradual increase in maze159
complexity with some notable exceptions (Fragaszy et al., 2009; Pan et al., 2011). Another160
common feature of most of these alley maze tasks is that they are presented on a computer161
screen. Such computerized tasks provide only visual information to the subjects and prevent the162
8subjects from gathering additional information on the task for example by haptically exploring163
the mazes. Therefore, such computerized mazes might be less salient to the subjects which164
might, in turn, negatively affect their performance.165
Secondly, serial ordering tasks (also termed sequential chaining; Terrace, 1984) have been166
used to assess planning abilities in nonhuman primates (e.g. Beran, Pate, Washburn, &167
Rumbaugh, 2004; Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007; Kawai & Matsuzawa,168
2000; Scarf & Colombo, 2009). In this task a number of stimuli are shown simultaneously on a169
computer screen. Subjects are trained to respond to the stimuli in a fixed order. For instance,170
Biro and Matsuzawa (1999) trained the female chimpanzee Ai to order three Arabic numerals171
ranging from 0 to 9. After training was completed, they introduced so-called switch trials.172
Crucially, in these switch trials the location of the second and third numeral was interchanged173
after the response to the first numeral. If the chimpanzee already had planned the response to174
the second stimulus before or while making her response to the first stimulus, the performance175
should drop in these trials. This is exactly what Biro and Matsuzawa (1999) found. Ai increased176
her error rate and response times after the location of the second and third stimulus had177
changed. Therefore, Ai seemed to have planned one choice ahead before or while the first178
move was executed. Meanwhile these results have been replicated with three additional179
chimpanzees (Beran et al., 2004), six rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta; Beran et al., 2004;180
Scarf, Danly, Morgan, Colombo, & Terrace, 2011), eight capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella;181
Beran & Parrish, 2012), and partially also with two pigeons (Columbia livia; Scarf & Colombo,182
2010). In contrast, when switch trials were introduced later in the sequence (interchanging the183
location between the third and fourth stimulus) there was no drop in performance in184
chimpanzees (Beran et al., 2004) and in rhesus monkeys there was only a drop in performance185
in one of four individuals (Scarf et al., 2011). Thus, the planning abilities of chimpanzees and186
rhesus macaques seemed to be largely limited to one step in this paradigm (maybe with the187
9exception of one rhesus monkey who seemed to have planned two steps ahead). However,188
recent evidence based on eyetracking with long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) on a189
similar serial ordering task cast some doubt on whether monkeys engaged in planning while190
solving the task (Scarf & Colombo, 2009). Scarf and Colombo found that the increased latency191
to respond to the first item in the sequence was not due to scanning the whole array of items192
and predetermining multiple responses before the onset of the first response but rather an193
artifact of the serial ordering task.194
Another variation of the serial ordering task consists of masking the stimuli on the screen after195
the selection of the first one. Here, the results from different labs are inconsistent: Matsuzawa196
and colleagues (Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007, 2009; Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2000) showed that five197
chimpanzees could correctly remember sequences between four and up to seven items. In198
contrast, Beran and colleagues (2004) found that two chimpanzees and two rhesus macaques199
presented with mask trials remembered only one item beyond the current one whereas one200
additional chimpanzee remembered two items. Note however, that successful subjects in201
masking trials do not necessarily plan the entire sequence before their first move but encode202
and store the presented stimuli in working memory and then respond to one stimulus after the203
other without planning ahead (eidetic strategy).204
In summary, the evidence from all of these experimental studies suggests that even after205
extensive training and shaping procedures the planning abilities of nonhuman primates (i.e. for206
great apes the evidence is largely restricted to chimpanzees) is limited to one step. Thus, hill207
climbing might explain these findings, i.e. while executing the current decision the next step is208
already considered by means of a goodness of fit approximation between the outcome of the209
current move and the goal state. There is no evidence of the more demanding subgoaling210
strategy based on the predetermination of a sequence of subgoals, that is, before the current211
decision is made. None of the above reviewed studies has examined whether the apes had212
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considered an upcoming choice before the current one was made. Such a subgoaling strategy,213
however, appears to be crucial for complex, multi-step activities. Furthermore, it is unclear to214
what extent the previously identified planning abilities depend on training.215
With regard to the cognitive substrate, subgoaling includes the representation, maintenance,216
updating and hierarchical organization of multiple goals in working memory towards an217
overarching goal and the inhibition of (prepotent) actions before the plan is formulated218
(behavioral inhibition). Subgoaling therefore involves what has been considered as the core of219
executive functions: working memory, cognitive flexibility, and inhibitory control (e.g. Diamond,220
2006; Fuster, 2002; Goldman‐Rakic, 1987; Kimberg & Farah, 1993; Miyake et al., 2000;221
Norman & Shallice, 1980; Roberts & Pennington, 1996; Shallice, 1982). These executive222
functions have commonly been related to the frontal lobe in both, humans and monkeys.223
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the enhanced cognitive abilities of humans compared224
to other primates are based on functional and structural specializations in the prefrontal cortex225
(Fuster, 2002; Roth & Dicke, 2005). Interestingly, humans and great apes, however, share a226
particularly large frontal cortex (Semendeferi, Lu, Schenker, & Damásio, 2002). At the227
behavioral level little is known about the evolution of these executive functions. In the present228
study we therefore seek to investigate the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origin of planning229
abilities using a comparative approach including human children and our closest living relatives,230
the great apes. In particular, we retrace the evolution of the components of subgoaling by231
disentangling great apes’ and children’s limitations in attentional control (shifting attention232
across a sequence of subgoals) and motor control (inhibiting prepotent responses).233
In order to address these issues, we presented all four species of nonhuman great apes (Pan234
paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo abelii; see Experiment 1) as well as 4-and 5-235
year-old human children (see Experiment 3) with a vertical maze apparatus. The task for the236
subjects was to negotiate a reward placed on the uppermost level via open gaps located in each237
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level through the maze to one of two exits. While doing so, the subjects had to avoid traps that238
blocked some of the openings. We presented twenty-four trial-unique configurations of these239
traps to our subjects. Importantly, the maze was organized as a decision tree. A major240
advantage of this design was that it allowed us to assess whether and if so, how many241
decisions (0-2) our subjects considered beyond their current decision. In addition, the design242
enabled us to assess the degree of motor control that guided their performance. Following243
Willatts’ (1989) definitions described above, we interpreted the predetermination of sequences244
of actions as evidence for the usage of a subgoaling strategy. If we could ascribe subjects’245
performance solely to a trial-to-trial post-error adjustment (possibly involving the usage of a246
fixed heuristic that guides each single decision) this would suggest the usage of a (planful)247
forward search strategy.248
Contrary to most other published studies on planning in nonhuman primates, this paradigm did249
not involve prior training or any shaping procedures. Consequently, the current experimental250
design allowed us to assess great apes’ and children’s planning abilities in a more spontaneous251
manner. Based on previous research reviewed above, we hypothesized that great apes and 4-252
year-old children were able to plan at least one step ahead and that 5-year-olds would show253
superior planning abilities to 4-year-old children.254
A further point that we address in this article is the effect of aging on planning abilities. In255
humans, there is a well-documented cognitive decline in executive functions (including planning)256
related to normal aging (e.g. Dempster, 1992; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; Salthouse, Atkinson, &257
Berish, 2003; West, 1996). Similarly, in rhesus macaques age-related cognitive impairments, in258
particularly a perseveration tendency and short-term memory deficits, have been found (Bartus,259
Fleming, & Johnson, 1978; Lai, Moss, Killiany, Rosene, & Herndon, 1995; Makris et al., 2007).260
As these behavioral changes seem to be rooted in a structural decline of the frontal lobe that is261
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present in different primate taxa (Bourgeois, Goldman-Rakic, & Rakic, 1994; Hedden & Gabrieli,262
2004), we hypothesized that planning abilities of great apes would decrease with age too.263
264
Experiment 1265
266
Methods267
Subjects268
Two bonobos (Pan paniscus), seven chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), one gorillas (Gorilla269
gorilla) and two orangutans (Pongo abelii) participated in this experiment. The subjects were270
housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Research Center, Leipzig Zoo (Leipzig, Germany). There were 8271
females and 4 males aged between 6 and 35 years (Mage 17.0 years). Four subjects were272
nursery-reared and eight mother-reared (see Table 1 for detailed information on each subject).273
Subjects had participated in various cognitive tasks prior to the study. A study by Seed and274
colleagues (2009) is particularly relevant here. As in the current study the subjects also had to275
move a reward with their fingers either to the left or to the right while avoiding traps (that differed276
in appearance from the ones used in the present task). In contrast to the present study,277
however, there was no planning involved beyond the current decision. Only three of the seven278
chimpanzees of the current sample (Alex, Fifi, and Sandra) had participated in this prior study.279
Subjects lived in social groups of different sizes and had access to indoor (175–430 m²) and280
outdoor areas (1400–4000 m²). They were tested individually in special testing rooms (5.1–7.3281
m²). Subjects were not deprived of food and water was available ad libitum during testing.282
283
284
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Materials285
The apparatus consisted of quadrangular box (height x length x depth: 47 x 67 cm x 5 cm) that286
was mounted to the wall of the enclosure (see Figure 1). Inside the box there was a vertical287
maze consisting of three horizontal levels that were made of grey PVC material. Open gaps288
(width: 3 cm) located in these levels allowed to pass the food reward that was placed in the289
maze on to the next lower levels. In total, there were 10 gaps located over three of the maze’s290
levels. The gaps were distributed symmetrically, that is when our subjects moved the reward291
into a gap it fell always in between two gaps on the next level. On the first (uppermost) level,292
there were two gaps, on the second and third level, there were four gaps each. Furthermore,293
there was a vertical partition located in the middle of the apparatus between the second and294
third gap on the second and third level. Underneath each opening there were two transparent295
pieces of acrylic glass that channeled the food reward and a patch of rubber material glued to296
the apparatus to cushion the food reward when it fell from one level to the next. Both of these297
additional items served to prevent the food reward from skipping one level accidentally.298
The front side of the apparatus (which was accessible to the apes) was made of transparent299
acrylic glass and contained three horizontal rows of ten slits each (height x width 1.8 x 5 cm;300
distance between the slits 1 cm) that allowed the apes to stick in their fingers and to move the301
food reward to the left and to the right on all three levels. The apes could extract the food302
reward from the apparatus via two large, circular holes on the lower side of the maze (diameter303
5.4 cm). Two ramps on the left and right of each hole ensured that the reward would roll behind304
one of the holes when the subjects passed the reward on from the third level to the bottom of305
the apparatus.306
The experimenter could access the backside of the apparatus, made of transparent acrylic307
glass. It contained a circular opening in the middle of the uppermost level that we used for308
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baiting purposes. Furthermore, there were ten openings (height x length 3.0 x 4.5 cm)309
corresponding to the location of each of the maze’s gaps. The experimenter inserted yellow310
traps through these openings to block the gaps and, thus, to prevent the passage of the reward.311
The subjects could visually inspect the yellow traps, made of stained, acrylic glass (height x312
length x depth 1.5 x 4 x 3.5 cm) when the experimenter inserted them in the apparatus. We313
used monkey chow pellets (height x length x depth 2.0 x 3.0 x 2.0 cm) as rewards. The pieces314
of monkey chow were solid and thick enough to prevent subjects from just pulling them through315
the slits in the front side of the apparatus.316
317
Procedure and Design318
In the beginning of each trial, the experimenter placed three traps into the apparatus in full view319
of the subjects so that they could visually assess the traps and their function (blockage of free320
passage). Then the experimenter introduced the reward into the apparatus via the baiting hole321
in the backside of the apparatus on the uppermost level. The trial ended when the subject had322
obtained the reward or had pushed it into a trap. When the subject had obtained the reward, we323
moved on to the next configuration. When the subject failed, the experimenter removed the324
trapped reward and dropped it into the food bucket. After 3-5 sec, the experimenter started the325
next trial by inserting another piece of food into the apparatus.326
There were two rounds of 24 trial-unique trap configurations per subject (in total: 48327
configurations). We employed a maximum of 16 trials per configuration. When the subjects328
failed to obtain the reward after 16 trials with a given configuration, we skipped it and329
administered the next configuration. Each session consisted of a maximum of 16 trials or 3330
configurations (depending on which criterion was reached first).331
15
There were two independent variables with regard to maze complexity: level of planning (LoP)332
and changes in direction (CiD). With regard to the LoP, the subject had to consider at the333
beginning of a given trial only the first (uppermost) level, the first and second (intermediate)334
level, or all three levels to obtain the reward. For each LoP, there were eight different335
configurations: in LoP 0, one trap was located in the uppermost level, the other two traps were336
either both in the second level or in the third level, either at position 1 and 4 or at position 2 and337
3 (for an example see Figure 2a). To solve such configurations the apes only had to take into338
account the traps at the current level, that is, the level where the reward was currently located.339
In LoP 1, two traps were blocking both openings on one side of the second level; the third trap340
was located on the other side either also in the second or in the third level (see Figure 2b).341
Hence, the apes could not solve this task by only taking into account the uppermost level in the342
beginning of a trial (as there were no traps in the uppermost level). Instead, they had to look one343
level ahead, that is, when making the first decision on the uppermost level the traps in the344
second level had to be considered. For LoP 2, two traps were placed in one side of the third345
level (i.e. this side was completely blocked), the third trap was on the other side, either also on346
the third or on the second level (see Figure 2c). Therefore, the apes had to consider the traps in347
the third level when the reward was still at the uppermost level when making the decision where348
to move the food reward. Hence, LoP was a measure of spatial distance of the task relevant349
items (i.e. the traps) from the starting point. The factor LoP allowed us to manipulate how many350
subgoals the subjects had to consider in order to make an informed first decision.351
The second independent factor was number of changes in direction (CiD) that the subject had to352
perform to gain the reward after the first decision was made. In half of the 24 configurations,353
there was no change in direction necessary, that is, the apes either had to push the reward354
completely to the left or to the right to get the reward. In the other half of configurations, they355
had to change the direction of the reward once, that is, after deciding for the right of left side on356
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the uppermost level the apes had to change the direction of the reward in the second or third357
level to the other side. Thus, CiD can be considered as measure of path complexity by358
manipulating the degree of motor control required to solve the maze. The number of changes in359
direction was completely balanced across the different LoP configurations: for each LoP four360
configurations involved no change in direction (CiD 0) and four involved one change (CiD 1) in361
direction. The “correct” side of the maze was balanced across the 24 configurations. Finally, the362
order of configurations was pseudo-randomized with the restriction that no more than two363
configurations of the same LoP were presented in a row.364
365
Scoring and analysis366
We videotaped all trials. We scored the following four dependent measures (see Table 2): (1)367
whether subjects obtained the reward in the first trial (T1) of a given configuration (T1 success,368
chance-level: 25% correct), (2) whether the first gap in the uppermost level into which they369
moved the reward in T1 was on the correct side for the final solution (T1 first decision, chance-370
level: 50% correct), (3) whether the first movement in T1 of the food reward on the uppermost371
level was directed towards the correct or incorrect side for the final solution (T1 first move,372
chance level: 50% correct), and (4) the number of trials per configuration the subjects needed to373
obtain the reward (chance-level: 4 trials). Moreover, we scored perseveration errors, that is, an374
error that was exactly the same error (level and position) incurred in the previous trial of the375
same configuration. In case the subjects failed within 16 trials we scored 17 trials for this376
configuration (i.e. the minimum number in which they could have solved the configuration). A377
second coder scored 20 % of the trials to assess interobserver reliability, which was excellent378
(T1 success: Κ =1.0, N=113, p<0.001; T1 first decision: Κ=1.0, N=113, p<0.001; T1 first move: 379
Κ =0.93, N=113, p<0.001; number of trials per configuration: rS=1.0, N=113, p<0.001).380
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Subjects who performed above chance only with regard to the number of trials per configuration381
were indicative of significant post-error corrections. Above chance performance in T1 success382
was indicative of successful sequential decision making without necessarily taking into account383
upcoming levels. If the first decision was made completely randomly, subjects could still have384
obtained the reward in 50% of T1 trials (which was significantly above the chance level of 25%385
correct). Above chance performance in T1 first decision (in particular in LoP 1 and 2386
configurations) was indicative of planning, that is, upcoming levels were considered when the387
first decision was made. Finally, above chance level performance in T1 first move was indicative388
of whether planning was completed before the initial motor response was executed.389
We applied Pearson's correlations to assess the relation between the T1 success performance390
and age. All p-values reported here are exact and two-tailed. Assumption of normality was met391
for the current data (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p>0.05). At the individual level, we used binomial392
tests for the binary variables T1 success and T1 first decision and the Wilcoxon signed rank test393
for the count variable number of trials per configuration to test against the chance level.394
To test whether the dependent variables T1 success, T1 first decision, and number of trials per395
configuration were influenced by the factors level of planning (LoP), changes in direction (CiD),396
repetition of configurations, and the age of the subjects we used a Generalized Linear Mixed397
Model (GLMM; Baayen, 2008) into which we included these four predictors as covariates and398
subject as well as configuration identity as random effects. The models were fitted in R (R399
Development Core Team, 2011) using the function lmer of the R-package lme4 (Bates &400
Maechler, 2010). We assessed model stability by comparing the estimates derived by a model401
based on all data with those obtained from a model with subjects excluded one by one. The402
significance of the full model as compared to the null model (comprising only random effects;403
Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011) was established using a likelihood ratio test (Dobson, 2002).404
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Therefore, we used the R function anova with argument test set to "Chisq". All models reported405
here were found to be significant (p<0.01).406
As the dependent variable ‘number of trials’ was a count response we used a poisson error407
distribution and the log link function. The response variables ‘success in T1’ and ‘first decision in408
T1’ were binary (success/failure), therefore, we specified binomial errors and the logit link409
function. We z-transformed all predictors to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to410
get comparable estimates. The intercepts of the models represented the sample mean assumed411
by the models. In the case of the logistic models, the fitted mean is revealed by the inverse logit-412
transformation of the intercept (i.e. exp(intercept)/(1+exp(intercept)). The corresponding P-value413
of the intercept indicates whether the intercept deviates significantly from the equal distribution414
which was the null hypothesis for the variable “first decision in T1” (proportion of correct415
decisions = 0.5). However, for the dependent variable “success in T1” the chance value was416
0.25. Therefore, we subtracted the logit-transformed chance-value from the estimate of the417
intercept and calculated the corresponding z- and P-value based on this adjusted estimate. In418
the case of the poisson model, the fitted mean is revealed by the inverse log-function419
(exp(intercept)). As the chance value of the count variable “number of trials per configuration”420
was 4, we subtracted the log-transformed chance value from the estimate of the intercept and421
calculated the z- and P-value based on the adjusted estimate. However, since the dependent422
variables were not based on a simple linear function of the given predictor variables in the423
models, there was a minimal deviation of the sample mean assumed by the model from the424
actual sample mean. We corrected for this small deviation by adjusting the scaled variables by425
adding a constant value chosen such that the absolute difference between the actual sample426
mean and the fitted mean was minimized (the corresponding function was written by Roger427
Mundry, and is available upon request). Doing so did not affect any terms of the model except428
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for the intercept. Thereby, the intercept in these models became a reliable test of subjects’429
performance against chance while controlling for the covariates and random effects.430
431
Results432
Trial 1 Success with each Unique Maze Configuration433
Overall, subjects solved significantly more configurations in their first trial than expected by434
chance (40.3 ± 5.6% correct, z=3.46, p<0.001). Thus, subjects at the group level had learnt to435
avoid the traps. The GLMM indicates significant effects of CiD, repetition of configurations, and436
age on success in T1 (see Table 3): subjects performed better when no change in direction was437
necessary (CiD 0), improved in the second round compared to the first one, and younger438
subjects performed better than older ones. In line with that, subjects only scored above chance439
when no change in direction was required and in the second round (but not in the first one). The440
age effect on performance was supported by a significant correlation (Pearson correlation: r=-441
0.59, n=12, p<0.05; see Figure 3 and Table 4). In contrast, there was no significant main effect442
of LoP. Across LoP, subjects solved more trials in T1 than expected by chance (see Table 3).443
At an individual level, four chimpanzees and one bonobo performed significantly above chance444
(p<0.05; see Table S1) and one further subject (an orangutan) performed above chance445
(p<0.05) in the second round. These six subjects who learnt to avoid the traps (Mage 12.7 ± 1.6446
years) were on average much younger than the remaining five subjects (Mage 23.0 ± 5.2).447
Thus, in contrast, to three older individuals (>20 years of age) most of the younger apes at the448
individual level had learnt to avoid the traps as indicated by their significant above-chance449
performance in trial 1of each unique maze configuration (see Table S1). In subsequent450
analyses we focused on these younger subjects (N=9; <20 years of age) to exclude the451
20
confounding effect of older subjects that performed randomly even when they did not have to452
plan ahead on our measure of planning.453
454
First decision in trial 1 of each unique maze configuration455
Overall, the younger subjects (N=9) performed significantly better than expected by chance in456
their first decision in T1 (64.8 ± 3.6 % correct, z=4.07, p<0.001). Thus, subjects at the sub-group457
level considered the trap configuration when making their first decision at the uppermost level.458
The GLMM indicates no significant effects of age, LoP, CiD, or repetition (see Table 3).459
Across the different LoPs, we found that the younger apes performed not only above chance in460
LoP 0 configurations but also in LoP 1 and LoP 2 (see Table 4, for an example see461
supplementary video 1) suggesting that the younger apes already considered two upcoming462
decisions before making the current one. Furthermore, the younger subjects performed above463
chance across CiD (see Table 4) suggesting that this measure of maze complexity was not a464
limiting factor for their first decision.465
Considering the individual data we found that overall four subjects performed significantly above466
chance (three chimpanzees and one bonobo, all p<0.05; see Table S2). Of these four subjects467
two scored significantly above chance in LoP 0, one in LoP 1, and two in LoP 2 configurations.468
469
First Move in trial 1 of each unique maze configuration470
When looking at the first move of the food reward of the younger apes we found that subjects471
performed above chance (63.2 ± 4.5 % correct, z=2.97, p<0.05, see Table 4) indicating that the472
decision was made before the movement was executed.473
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Number of trials per configuration to success474
Overall, the younger subjects did not perform different from the chance level of 4 trials (3.28 ±475
0.46 trials, z=-1.16, p>0.1). Therefore, we found no evidence for efficient post-error476
adjustments. This finding can be ascribed to the high rate of perseveration errors (i.e. the exact477
same error as in the previous trial): on average subjects made 43.2 ± 14.2 perseveration errors.478
In 47.2 % of all error trials in which a perseveration error could occur (i.e. excluding the first trial479
of each configuration) subjects repeated the previously made error. The GLMM indicates480
significant effects of repetition of configurations (see Table 5): subjects needed more trials per481
configuration in the first round than in the second round. In contrast, there was no significant482
main effect of LoP, CiD or age.483
At an individual level, five chimpanzees and one bonobo (that all were < 20 years old) solved484
the maze task in significantly less than 4 trials (all p<0.05, see Table S3). Two additional485
subjects, one bonobo and one orangutan, performed significantly better than chance in their486
second round (p<0.05).487
488
Discussion489
Most of our younger subjects below the age of 20 years (four chimpanzees, one bonobo, and490
one orangutan) learnt to avoid the traps in contrast to the older ones. Importantly, these younger491
subjects considered not only the current level (LoP 0) when making the first decision. Instead,492
they took already the second and third level into account (LoP 1 and 2). This finding suggests493
that great apes below a certain age are able to plan their actions without extensive training up to494
two steps ahead. When errors occurred, however, the apes showed high levels of495
perseveration, that is, they had problems to adjust their behavior efficiently on a trial-to-trial496
basis.497
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The negative correlation between age and first trial performance suggests that, as predicted by498
studies on the age-related decline of executive functions in humans (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004;499
Salthouse et al., 2003) and monkeys (Bartus et al., 1978; Lai et al., 1995; Makris et al., 2007),500
apes’ planning abilities decrease with age. The only juvenile ape that failed to learn to avoid the501
traps was a female gorilla. Interestingly, gorillas were previously found to perform worst among502
the great apes in various inhibition tasks (Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008). Though caution is503
required here as we have only tested a single gorilla, week inhibitory control might underlie the504
juvenile gorilla’s failure in the present task.505
CiD but not LoP had a significant impact on the performance of our nonhuman subjects. CiD506
reflects the need to update the initially chosen direction on the second or third level of the maze507
(which often went along with a change of the hand used to move the reward). Updating the508
motor direction involves the inhibition of the previous response. LoP has also an inhibition509
component, that is, to suppress the action (first move) before a plan has been made. This type510
of inhibition, however, is different from changing the direction of the reward as it is not so much511
about the inhibition of previously used (prepotent) actions. The second important factor for LoP,512
however, seems the representation and updating of the plan (the sequence of subgoals towards513
to overarching goal) in working memory. The present data therefore suggest that nonhuman514
apes have difficulty in inhibiting previously used actions but not to plan and to represent a515
sequence of subgoals towards a goal.516
With regard to the timing of apes’ decision making process we were looking at the first move of517
the pellet on the uppermost level. Using a forward search or hill climbing strategy, the apes518
might have started to move the food reward randomly and still could have corrected the first519
move if necessary before the reward was moved into the first gap. But that was not what we520
found: some of the younger apes directed their first move of the reward to the correct side521
(across the different levels of planning). Thus, the decision involving the consideration of522
23
upcoming levels was already made before the execution of the motor command. In other words,523
these apes planned before they acted.524
Alternatively to the planning account, the apes might have rapidly learnt to make the first525
decision based on a fixed heuristic: avoid the side with two traps. Using such a rule would have526
yielded a perfect performance with the trap configurations used in Experiment 1. In order527
differentiate between a planning strategy and such a fixed heuristic, we conducted a follow-up528
experiment with two traps on each side.529
530
531
Experiment 2532
In Experiment 2, we examined whether those apes who learnt to avoid the traps in Experiment 1533
based their first decision on the heuristic: avoid the side of the apparatus with two traps. In534
Experiment 2, we inserted four traps in the apparatus, two on each side, to render this heuristic535
ineffective. We hypothesized that if the apes performed above chance in their first decision in T1536
the usage of this heuristic would be ruled out.537
At the same time, the additional trap made the correct side (and therefore, the correct path)538
more complex as it contained two instead of just one trap. From a cognitive point of view, the539
apes might have used two different, though both valid strategies in Experiment 1: avoiding the540
blocked side (inference by exclusion) or planning of the correct path to follow (subgoaling). The541
comparison of Experiment 1 (3 traps) with Experiment 2 (4 traps) would allow us to draw a542
conclusion with regard to what kind of strategy the apes most likely used to solve the task: if543
their performance was negatively affected by the additional trap in the correct side of the maze,544
this would favor a subgoaling account.545
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546
Methods547
Subjects548
The seven subjects who had passed Experiment 1 participated in this experiment. They549
included one bonobo, five chimpanzees, and one orangutan (see Table 1). There were 4550
females and 3 males aged between 6 and 18 years (Mage 12.7 years). Two subjects were551
nursery-reared and five mother-reared.552
553
Materials554
The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1.555
556
Procedure and Design557
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that we inserted now four traps558
instead of three in the apparatus.559
Like in Experiment 1, there were two rounds of 24 trial-unique configurations per subject (in560
total: 48 configurations). Per configuration we employed 16 trials at maximum. When the561
subjects failed to obtain the reward after 16 trials with a configuration we went on with the next562
configuration. Per session there was a maximum of 24 trials or 8 configurations (depending on563
which criterion was reached first). The order of presentations was pseudo-randomized with the564
restriction that no more than two configurations of the same LoP were presented in a row.565
The additional trap did not affect the factor level of planning (LoP). Again, there were three LoPs566
(0-2) of eight configurations each. In contrast, the second independent variable, changes in567
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direction (CiD), was affected by the additional trap that was entered in the apparatus. Besides568
CiD 0 and 1 there were CiD 2 configurations in which the subject had to change the direction of569
the food reward after the first decision twice on the second and third level. For CiD 0 and 2,570
there were 6 configurations each, for CiD 1, there were 12 configurations. The number of571
changes in direction was completely balanced across the different LoPs: for each LoP, there572
were two CiD 0 and 2 configurations, respectively, and four CiD 1 configurations. Finally, the573
correct side of the apparatus was balanced across the 24 configurations.574
575
Scoring and analysis576
Scoring and analyses were largely identical to Experiment 1. However, the chance levels577
differed in Experiment 2: number of trials per configuration had a chance level of 8 trials,578
considering T1 success chance was at 12.5 % correct. T1 first decision was not affected by the579
additional trap (chance level: 50 % correct).580
We used the same GLMM as in Experiment 1. To compare their performance in T1 first decision581
between Experiment 1 and 2 we ran a combined GLMM with the data of the seven subjects that582
completed both Experiments. In this model we included the factors number of traps (i.e.583
Experiment 1 and 2), LoP, repetition of configurations, and age of subjects. CiD was not entered584
in this model as this factor was associated with the number of traps entered.585
586
587
588
589
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Results590
Trial 1 Success with each Unique Maze Configuration591
Overall, subjects solved significantly more configurations in their first trial than expected by592
chance (49.4 ± 4.8%, z=15.12, p<0.001) indicating that they avoided the traps at least at the593
current level. The GLMM indicates significant effects of LoP, CiD, and age on success in T1594
(see Table 6): subjects performed significantly better in LoP 0 (z=2.34, p<0.05) than in LoP 2595
configurations. There was no significant difference between LoP 0 and 1 (z=0.37, p>0.5) or596
between LoP 1 and 2 (z=1.94, p=0.052). Moreover, subjects performed better when no change597
in direction was required (CiD0) compared to one change (CiD 1, z=4.53, p<0.001) and two598
changes in direction (CiD 2, z=3.63, p<0.001). In contrast, there was no difference between CiD599
1 and CiD 2 (z=0.47, p>0.5). Finally, younger subjects performed better than older ones600
(Pearson correlation: r=-0.77, n=7, p<0.05; see Figure 4). No significant effect was found for601
repetition of configurations. Across LoPs, CiDs, and repetitions subjects were above chance. At602
an individual level, all subjects were overall above chance (all p<0.01, see Table S4).603
604
First decision in trial 1 of each unique maze configuration605
Overall, the subjects made their first decision significantly more often to the correct side (57.7 ±606
3.6%, z=2.75, p<0.01) than expected by chance, a finding that was already evident in the first607
round (57.7 ± 3.9%, z=1.97, p<0.05). The GLMM indicates significant effects of CiD and age608
(see Table 6): subjects performed significantly better in the first decision in CiD 0 configurations609
compared to CiD 1 (z=3.34, p<0.001) or CiD 2 (z=2.75, p<0.01). In contrast, there was no610
difference between CiD 1 and 2 (z=0.27, p>0.5) configurations. In line with that, they only611
scored above chance in CiD 0 configurations but not in CiD 1 or 2 configurations. Finally,612
younger subjects performed better than older ones. No significant effect was found for LoP or613
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repetition of configurations. Subjects scored significantly above chance in LoP 0 and 1 but not in614
LoP 2 configurations. Thus, with four traps inserted in the apparatus we found evidence that the615
apes at the group level considered one (but not two) upcoming decisions when making the616
current one.617
At the individual level, one chimpanzee performed significantly above chance (p<0.01), one618
further chimpanzee performed on a marginally significant level (p=0.059; see Table S5). Both of619
these subjects also tended to score above chance in LoP 0 and 1 configurations (p<.1) but not620
in LoP 2 (p>0.5).621
Comparing T1 first decision between Experiment 1 and 2, the GLMM reveals that their first622
decision was significantly worse when four rather than three traps were entered in the apparatus623
(see Table 7). The finding indicates that with two traps at each side of the apparatus the apes624
had more problems to make an informed first decision even though they still performed625
significantly above chance.626
627
Number of trials per configuration to success628
Overall, subjects needed significantly fewer trials than the chance level (= 8 trials) per629
configuration (2.38 ± 0.23, z=18.64, p <0.001). The GLMM indicates significant effects of LoP,630
CiD, age, and repetition of configurations (see Table 8): subjects needed fewer trials in LoP 0631
(z=2.46, p<0.05) and LoP 1 (z=1.99, p<0.05) compared to LoP 2 configurations. In contrast,632
there was no difference between LoP 0 and 1 (z=0.67, p>0.5). Furthermore, subjects required633
fewer trials in CiD 0 configurations than in CiD 1 (z=5.23, p<0.001) and 2 (z=5.00, p<0.001)634
configurations. In contrast, there was no difference between CiD 1 and 2 (z=-0.74, p>0.1).635
Finally, younger subjects performed better than older ones and subjects performed significantly636
better in the second round than in the first round. Across LoP, CiD, and repetition of637
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configurations subjects performed above chance. At an individual level, all subjects performed638
above chance (all p<0.01, see Table S6).639
640
Discussion641
At the group level, the seven great apes that in Experiment 1 succeeded in the first trial (with642
three traps entered in the apparatus) were also able to solve the four-trap version of the task.643
More specifically, they succeeded in the first trial more often and required fewer trials per644
configuration than expected by chance. Additionally, these apes also chose the correct side in645
their first decision of the first trial. In fact, they picked the correct side significantly above chance646
in LoP 0 and 1 configurations. Therefore, the heuristic “avoiding the side with two traps” seems647
not to be sufficient to explain the apes’ first decision. At the individual level, it became apparent648
that in particular the two youngest chimpanzees showed robust evidence for planning in the649
four-trap version of the current task.650
Instead, the impact of CiD, i.e. the change in direction of the reward on the second and third651
level of the maze, on the first decision (that is made on the first level) highlights two issues.652
First, the apes took the subsequent levels into account when making the first decision. Second,653
only the least complex configurations (i.e., those not requiring a change in direction) were654
planned thoroughly by the subjects. In contrast, the same seven subjects were able in655
Experiment 1 to plan the correct path in CiD 1 configurations suggesting that the increased656
maze complexity (with four traps) is responsible for their failure in CiD 1 and 2 configurations of657
Experiment 2.658
Having ruled out the heuristic based on the number of traps on each side, a comparison659
between Experiment 1 and 2 is particularly informative with regard to the strategy used:660
inference by exclusion or planning. Recall that in Experiment 1 subjects could have used two661
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cognitive strategies to guide their first decision: either to avoid the side that was completely662
blocked (inference by exclusion), or to plan the path through the maze focusing also on the663
configuration of the correct side (subgoaling). In line with the subgoaling account, we found that664
the first decision was significantly worse in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1. Together665
with the impact of CiD on the T1 first decision performance, this finding suggests that the666
complexity of the correct path was a limiting factor for the ape’s performance in Experiment 2667
and that they were engaging in a subgoaling strategy when making the first decision.668
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669
Experiment 3670
Once we had established the strategy that apes used to solve the task and the impact of age on671
their performance, we presented 4- and 5-year-old human preschoolers with the same paradigm672
as the nonhuman apes in Experiment 1. Specifically, we were interested in whether the673
children’s performance would be affected by the same factors.674
675
Methods676
Subjects677
Fifteen 4-year-old and 12 5-year-old children recruited from seven different kindergartens in678
Leipzig, Germany participated in this experiment. These children were drawn from the679
participant database of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. As three children680
refused to be tested before all configurations could be completed our final sample consisted of681
12 4-year-olds and 12 5-year-olds that completed all trials (4-year-olds: Mage 47.4 ± 0.6 months,682
50 % females; 5-year-olds: Mage 59.5 ± 0.7 months, 50 % females). The excluded subjects683
performed on similar levels as the subjects of the same age that were included in the final684
sample.685
686
Materials687
The apparatus used in Experiment 3 was identical in construction to the one used with the688
nonhuman apes. The only difference was that the levels of the maze were made of wood689
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(instead of PVC). Moreover, the apparatus had a base-plate to keep it upright when it was690
placed on a table.691
692
Procedure and Design693
The procedure was similar to the nonhuman apes tested in Experiment 1. We administered two694
rounds of 24 trial-unique configurations. However, the children received eight trials per695
configuration at maximum (instead of 16). Per session there was a maximum of 48 trials or 24696
configurations (depending on which criterion was reached first).697
The reward for the children consisted of a toy that varied from trial to trial (stickers, marbles,698
balloons, etc.). This reward was put in a bottle cap and wrapped in aluminum foil before the699
child entered the test room. The cap prevented the children to remove the reward directly700
through the slits in the front side of the apparatus. The subjects could not see what was inside701
the cap before they extracted the reward from the apparatus and removed the aluminum foil.702
Subjects received only minimal verbal instruction at the beginning of each session. The703
standardized instruction was that the apparatus was a “gift machine”. The experimenter704
instructed the child that she was allowed to put her finger through all the slits in the front side of705
the apparatus and that there were two big holes at the bottom of the apparatus. Then the706
experimenter told the child that there were surprises that she could gain. The experimenter707
entered the traps in the apparatus in full view of the child and placed the first “surprise” inside708
the apparatus and prompted the child: “This surprise is for you. Go, get it out!” No instructions709
were given with regard how to remove the item from the apparatus or to the function of the710
traps.711
712
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Scoring and analysis713
Same as in Experiment 1. A second coder scored 20 % of the trials to assess interobserver714
reliability, which was excellent (T1 success: Κ=0.97, N=240, p<0.001; T1 first decision: Κ=1.0, 715
N=240, p<0.001; T1 first move: Κ =0.93, N=240, p<0.001; number of trials per configuration: 716
rS=0.95, N=240, p<0.001).717
In addition, to compare the motor control performance of children with the younger nonhuman718
apes (Exp. 1) we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with the dependent measure719
‘success in T1’ and the factors CiD and our three subject groups (younger nonhuman apes, 4-720
year-old children, and 5-year-old children). Moreover, to compare apes’ and children’s planning721
abilities we conducted another repeated measures ANOVA with the dependent measure ‘first722
decision in T1’ and the factors LoP and our three subject groups. Post-hoc pairwise723
comparisons (all p-values were Bonferroni corrected) were conducted on the basis of significant724
interactions.725
726
Results727
Trial 1 Success with each Unique Maze Configuration728
Overall, subjects solved significantly more configurations in their first trial than expected by729
chance (68.0 ± 2.6% correct, z=3.58, p<0.001). The GLMM indicates significant effects of LoP,730
repetition of configurations, and age on Trial 1 success (see Table 9): subjects performed better731
in LoP 0 than in LoP 1 (z=5.41, p<0.001) and LoP 2 configurations (z=5.43, p<0.001) and they732
were better in LoP 1 compared to LoP 2 configurations (z=2.41, p<0.05). Moreover, subjects733
improved in the second round compared to the first one, and 5-year-olds performed better than734
4-year-olds. Four- and 5-year-olds performed above chance across LoP (all p<.01). In contrast,735
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there was no significant main effect of CiD. Across CiD, subjects solved more trials in T1 than736
expected by chance (see Table 9). At an individual level, all 4- and 5-year-olds performed737
overall above chance (p<0.01; see Table S7).738
739
First decision in trial 1 of each unique maze configuration740
Overall, subjects performed better than expected by chance in their first decision in T1 (72.6 ±741
2.2 % correct, z=3.19, p=0.001). The GLMM indicates a significant effect of LoP, repetition, and742
age (see Table 9): subjects performed better in LoP 0 than in LoP 1 (z=4.93, p<0.001) and LoP743
2 configurations (z=5.57, p<0.001) and they were better in LoP 1 compared to LoP 2744
configurations (z=2.74, p<0.01). Moreover, subjects improved in the second round compared to745
the first one, and 5-year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds. However, at the group level746
both 4- and 5-year-olds only performed above chance in LoP 0 and 1 configurations but not in747
LoP 2 configurations (see Table 10). CiD did not have a significant effect on their performance.748
Across CiD, subjects solved more trials in T1 than expected by chance (see Table 10).749
Considering the individual data we found that eight of twelve 4-year-olds and ten of twelve 5-750
year-olds performed overall significantly above chance (all p<0.05; see Table S8). Of these751
eight 4-year-olds all scored significantly above chance in LoP 0, one in LoP 1, and none in LoP752
2 configurations. All ten 5-year-olds scored significantly above chance in LoP 0, seven in LoP 1,753
and one in LoP 2 configurations.754
755
First Move in trial 1 of each unique maze configuration756
When looking at the first move of the reward in the beginning of T1 we found that overall both 4-757
year-olds (60.1 ± 2.6 % correct, z=2.54, p<0.05) and 5-year-olds (71.4 ± 2.8 % correct, z=6.19,758
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p<0.001) performed above chance indicating that subjects decided before the movement was759
executed.760
761
Number of trials per configuration to success762
Overall, subjects required significantly fewer trials than expected by chance (1.56 ± 0.07 trials,763
z=20.94, p<0.001). With regard to perseveration errors, subjects made on average 8.0 ± 1.9 (4-764
year-olds: 10.3 ± 3.1, 5-year-olds: 5.8 ± 2.2) repetition errors. In 45.6 % of all error trials in765
which a perseveration error could occur (i.e. excluding the first trial of each configuration)766
subjects repeated the previously made error. The GLMM indicates significant effects of LoP,767
repetition of configurations, and age on success in T1 (see Table 11): subjects tended to768
perform better in LoP 0 than in LoP 1 (z=1.85, p=0.065) and LoP 2 configurations (z=3.00,769
p<0.01) and they tended to perform better in LoP 1 compared to LoP 2 configurations (z=1.87,770
p=0.062). Moreover, subjects improved in the second round compared to the first one, and 5-771
year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds. Four- and 5-year-olds performed above chance772
across LoP (all p<0.001). In contrast, there was no significant main effect of CiD. Across CiD,773
subjects required fewer trials than expected by chance (see Table 11). At an individual level, all774
4- and 5-year-olds performed overall above chance (p<0.001; see Table S9).775
776
Comparison between younger non-human apes and children777
With regard to success in T1 a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of778
group (F[2,30]=10.58; p<.001), CiD (F[1,30]=7.64; p<.05), and group x CiD interaction779
(F[2,30]=3.48; p<.05). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that 4-year olds performed better780
than apes only when a change in direction was required (CiD 1, p<0.05; CiD 0, p>0.5; see also781
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Figure 5). Five-year-olds performed better than the apes irrespective of CiD (CiD 0, p<0.05; CiD782
1, p<0.001). Finally, the performance of 4- and 5-year olds did not differ significantly irrespective783
of CiD (CiD 0, p>0.1, CiD 1, p>0.1).784
With regard to the first decision in T1 a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant a785
significant main effect of group (F[2,30]=4.04; p<.05), LoP (F[2,60]=37.16; p<.001), and a group786
x LoP interaction (F[4,60]=4.99; p<.01). Post-hoc tests revealed that 4-year olds performed787
better than apes in LoP 0 (p<0.01) but not in LoP 1 (p>0.5) or LoP 2 (p>0.5; see Figure 6). Five-788
year-olds performed better than the apes in LoP 0 (p<0.001) and LoP 1 (p<0.05) but not in LoP789
2 (p>0.5). Finally, 5-year olds performed better than 4-year-olds only in LoP 1 (p<0.05) but not790
in LoP 0 (p>0.1) or LoP 2 (p>0.5).791
792
Discussion793
Four- and 5-year-old preschoolers quickly learnt to avoid the traps without any prior training or794
instruction with regard to the function of the traps. Overall, the children made only few795
perseveration errors indicating that for the most part children adjusted their behavior flexibly796
when errors occurred. When one of the few errors occurred, however, the errors were made797
due to a perseveration bias in almost half of the cases.798
In line with our hypothesis, 5-year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds. Crucially, when799
making the first decision, the 4- and 5-year-old children did not only consider the current level800
(LoP 0) but also the next level (LoP 1). However, at the group level both, the 4- and 5-year-olds801
failed to consider traps located two levels ahead (LoP 2), At the individual level it became clear802
that all 4-year-olds except for one did not plan their moves reliably at all whereas most of the 5-803
year-olds considered at least one level beyond the current level and one individual even two804
levels. This finding suggests that 4-year-old children in the current task planned their actions at805
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maximum one step ahead while the 5-year-olds more reliably planned their actions and were806
able to plan their moves up to two steps ahead. In contrast to the younger nonhuman apes807
(Exp. 1), the children showed no drop in performance when a change in direction was required.808
Moreover, the children outperformed the younger apes in their first decision in LoP 0. In LoP 1,809
however, only the 5-year olds performed better than the younger apes and differences between810
groups disappeared in LoP 2.811
The difference in planning abilities of 4- and 5-year-old children reported here fits well with812
previous research showing an increase in planning abilities between four and five years of age813
across different experimental paradigms (Fabricius, 1988; Klahr & Robinson, 1981; Wellman et814
al., 1984, 1985). Wellman and colleagues (1985) noted that planning (compared to perceptual815
strategies such as sighting) becomes the dominant search strategy over the preschool years. In816
line with that, 4-year-olds were previously found to exhibit a mixture between sighting and817
planning (Fabricius, 1988) and were found to plan consistently only one choice ahead beyond818
the current one (Klahr & Robinson, 1981; Wellman et al., 1984). Five-year-olds were shown to819
consider alternatives in a route planning task (Fabricius, 1988) and most of them were found to820
be able to plan between two and four steps ahead in a variant of the Tower of Hanoi task (Klahr821
& Robinson, 1981). The current data provide an independent confirmation of these findings with822
4-year-olds exhibiting a limit to plan only one step ahead while 5-year-olds planned their moves823
more reliably and at least one 5-year-old was able to plan two steps ahead. Importantly, the824
accordance of the results of the current paradigm with established planning tasks such as route825
planning tasks or the Tower of Hanoi provides evidence for the validity of the current826
experimental setup.827
With regard to the predictors of the children’s performance we found that LoP but not CiD had a828
significant impact across the different response variables. Even the 5-year-olds’ performance829
markedly decreased from LoP 0 (91 % correct) to LoP 2 (60 %) indicating that planning ahead830
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in the currently used setting was not a trivial undertaking for them. Interestingly, the831
preschoolers’ performance was not affected by CiD, that is, they had no problems to update the832
direction of the reward on the second or third level. This indicates that (lack of) response833
inhibition alone seems not to be sufficient to explain their weak performance in LoP 2834
configurations. LoP describes the length of the sequence of subgoals that are to be considered835
when making the first decision. Therefore, the representation and updating of a sequence of836
more than one subgoal in working memory seems to be the limiting factor for the preschoolers’837
performance.838
Over the preschool years inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, working memory retention839
capacity and updating enhances (Diamond, 2006; Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008). Espy and840
Bull (2005) related working memory capacity of 3 to 6-year-old preschoolers to attentional841
control (while controlling for age). In contrast, response inhibition was not found to be related to842
working memory capacity. Accordingly, higher working memory capacity allowed preschoolers843
to maintain task-relevant information in an active state. Attentional control also plays a crucial844
role in the present task. With increasing levels of planning the subjects need to shift their845
attention across a sequence of subgoals to make an informed first decision. Such cognitive846
flexibility (also referred to as shifting) has also been related in preschoolers (Bull, Espy, & Senn,847
2004) to one of the standard planning tasks, the Tower of Hanoi. In line with that, the present848
results suggest that shifting attention between two or more subgoals is critical for children’s849
planning performance850
851
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852
General Discussion853
Comparing the performance of nonhuman great apes and human preschool children in the854
present maze task suggests that 4- and 5-year-olds were superior to the apes with regard to855
avoiding the traps when no planning was necessary and post-error trial-to-trial adjustments in856
behavior. This was indicated by a better performance in T1 success and number of trials per857
configurations of the children compared to the apes. However, when focusing on our measure858
of planning (T1 first decision: LoP 1 and 2) we found that younger nonhuman apes did perform859
at similar levels as human preschoolers. In contrast to the 4-year olds, two younger nonhuman860
apes and one 5-year-old preschooler were able to plan two steps ahead.861
In line with previous research, only 5-year-old human children were shown to be able to plan862
more than one step ahead which is the key for the development of a problem-reduction or863
subgoaling strategy. Importantly, we extend the usage of such subgoaling abilities here to864
nonhuman apes. Contrary to previous research using different, training-dependent paradigms,865
we show that also nonhuman apes (below the age of 20) are able to plan more than one step866
ahead. As shown in Experiment 2, this performance could not be solely attributed to a fixed867
heuristic or perceptual strategy such as sighting. Rather, the predetermination of the correct868
path before the first move of the reward on the uppermost level is indicative of a subgoaling869
strategy.870
One might argue that the comparison between nonhuman apes and human children is871
confounded by some differences in the experimental procedure: the children got only eight872
instead of 16 trials per configuration and they completed up to 48 instead of 16 trials per day.873
However, the younger nonhuman apes and the children only very rarely received eight or more874
trials per configuration. Therefore, the maximum number of trials per configuration is unlikely to875
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have a strong impact on the differences between the samples. The different number of sessions876
between the groups might indeed have affected the learning speed. However, when looking at877
the effect of order of configurations and repetition we found that both samples improved with878
regard to the number of trials per configuration and success in T1 across the two rounds of 24879
configurations. The children improved also with regard to the first decision in T1 between round880
1 and 2. The nonhuman apes, in contrast, did not improve in their first decision in T1 between or881
within the two rounds. Therefore, the finding that some of the younger nonhuman apes, unlike882
4-year-old children, performed significantly above chance in LoP 2 configurations is unlikely due883
to a difference in the number of sessions received.884
Despite these similarities in the extent of planning, detailed analyses of nonhuman apes and885
human preschoolers’ performance also revealed intriguing differences in their cognitive886
limitations: whereas the great apes’ performance was largely influenced by CiD, a measure of887
response inhibition, human children’s performance was not affected by this factor. Instead,888
children’s performance was mainly affected by LoP, a measure of the number of subgoals to be889
considered towards the overarching goal. Poor response inhibition is also a likely candidate for890
great apes’ failure to adjust their performance on a trial-to-trial basis and to avoid traps located891
in the current level as response inhibition is essential to overcome perseveratory tendencies.892
Thus, the present results suggest that great apes’ performance in the current task was limited893
by deficits in response inhibition whereas children had problems to control and shift their894
attention between subgoals. In line with that, previous research indicated that cognitive flexibility895
(shifting) exhibits a slower developmental trajectory than inhibition and working memory in896
human children (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006).897
With regard to the nonhuman apes, response inhibition as limiting factor for their problem-898
solving skills is also in line with previous studies: evidence from reverse contingency task899
(Boysen & Berntson, 1995; Boysen, Berntson, & Mukobi, 2001; Vlamings, Uher, & Call, 2006)900
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and the detour-reaching task (Vlamings, Hare, & Call, 2010) revealed considerable deficits in901
the inhibition of prepotent responses in great apes. However, note that in the latter study 4- and902
5-year-old children performed actually on similar levels to bonobos and chimpanzees but worse903
than orangutans. Also in trap tasks like the trap-tube task great apes showed serious difficulties904
to overcome their bias to move the reward towards their own body (Limongelli, Boysen, &905
Visalberghi, 1995; Povinelli, 2000). When they were allowed to rake the reward instead pushing906
it away from their body their performance increased dramatically (Martin-Ordas, Call, &907
Colmenares, 2008; Mulcahy & Call, 2006).908
In contrast to this shortage of response inhibition, working memory capacity and updating has909
been found to be excellent in nonhuman apes: the numerical ordering task revealed that910
chimpanzees can quickly store and update up to seven items in short-term memory with the911
highest performance achieved by a 7-year-old chimpanzee (Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007; Kawai &912
Matsuzawa, 2000). Taking together, previous research supports the characterization of great913
apes executive functions as indicated by the present data: weak response inhibition but high914
working memory performance.915
The current findings have implications for the evolution of executive functions and physical916
cognition: as shown by Herrmann and colleagues (2007) 2.5-year-old children exhibit similar917
cognitive skills as chimpanzees in the physical domain (including the scales measuring their918
understanding of space, quantities, and causality). The current study adds planning in the919
physical domain to this comparison. And again the nonhuman apes are found to perform at high920
levels compared to human children. Executive functions and the structure of the prefrontal921
cortex mature late in development in humans (Benes, 2001; Gogtay et al., 2004). This might922
explain why juvenile and young adult great apes even outperform 4-year-old human children in923
their planning abilities. Also, the age-related cognitive decline of planning abilities in nonhuman924
apes reported here match the findings of the human cognitive aging literature (e.g., Salthouse et925
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al., 2003; West, 1996). All of these findings are in line with a common underlying neural basis of926
great apes’ planning abilities in the prefrontal cortex. Thus, the sophisticated executive functions927
that allow the planning of multi-step activities appear to be a conserved trait across the evolution928
of great apes. In contrast, we found across all four species of nonhuman great apes deficits in929
motor control compared to 4- and 5-year-old human preschoolers. Interestingly, enhanced930
manual motor control has been proposed to be the common starting point for the evolution of931
hominin tool making and language (Ambrose, 2001). There is even a shared neural substrate932
(Broca’s area) of speech development and manual motor control (including tool use) during the933
first two years of human ontogeny (Greenfield, 1991). After the first two years, however, cortical934
differentiation is thought to lead to a more autonomous neural processing of speech and manual935
motor control. Therefore, the better performance of 4- and 5-year-old preschoolers in motor936
control compared to nonhuman apes might be based on an adaptation for tool use and /or937
language in the hominin lineage.938
In summary, the present study provides compelling evidence for the usage of a subgoaling939
strategy involving the planning of a sequence of at least two subgoals in nonhuman apes.940
Younger apes below the age of 20 years showed planning abilities that were on a par with 5-941
year-old human children. The cognitive limitations in this planning task, however, differed942
between humans and nonhumans: whereas all nonhuman ape species exhibited deficits in943
motor inhibition the human preschoolers showed difficulties in attentional control. This finding944
supports the notion that a major change in the human evolution has been to optimize motor945
control with its implications for language and tool-use (Greenfield, 1991). As in human children946
specialized skills for social cognition have been reported, future directions of this research may947
be to examine whether great apes planning abilities in the physical domain also extend to the948
social world.949
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Table 1 Species, age, sex, rearing history, and the experiments in which the subjects participated1133
Name Species Sex Age RearingHistory
Experiment
Participation
Kuno Bonobo m 14 Nursery 1, 2
Ulindi Bonobo f 17 Mother 1
Alex Chimpanzee m 10 Nursery 1, 2
Fifi Chimpanzee f 18 Mother 1, 2
Kofi Chimpanzee f 6 Mother 1, 2
Pia Chimpanzee f 12 Mother 1, 2
Riet Chimpanzee m 33 Nursery 1
Robert Chimpanzee m 35 Nursery 1
Sandra Chimpanzee f 18 Mother 1, 2
Kibara Gorilla f 7 Mother 1
Kila Orangutan f 11 Mother 1, 2
Pini Orangutan f 23 Mother 1
1134
1135
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Table 2 Dependent variables and their interpretation for above-chance performance.1136
Dependent
variables
Interpretation
Number of trials
per configuration
Efficient post-error
adjustment
T1 success Sequential decision making
(without planning ahead)
T1 first decision
(in LoP 1 and 2)
Upcoming decisions are
considered (i.e. planning)
T1 first move Planning executed before
motor response initiated
1137
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Table 3 Exp. 1: First trial performance as a function of the factors level of planning (LoP), change in1138
direction (CiD), age of subjects, and repetition of configurations. In bold the results of the GLMM are1139
presented including the estimates (Est), standard error of the mean (SEM) and P-value of each factor.1140
The intercept of the GLMM represents a test of subjects’ performance against the chance value. Below1141
each factor the means (M), SEM and P-values of the post-hoc tests (based on the intercept of the GLMM)1142
against the chance value are shown for the different levels of each factor.1143
Model terms T1 Success
M / Est SEM P
Intercept 0.71 0.20 0.001
LoP -0.10 0.20 0.302
0 0.44 0.07 <0.001
1 0.38 0.06 0.003
2 0.39 0.06 0.004
CiD -0.38 0.09 <0.001
0 0.48 0.06 0.000
1 0.33 0.06 0.092
Age -0.54 0.21 0.009
Repetition 0.33 0.09 <0.001
1 0.34 0.05 0.072
2 0.47 0.07 0.000
1144
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Table 4: First trial (T1) performance of younger individuals (< 20 years, N=9) in Exp. 1. In bold the results1146
of the GLMM are presented including the estimates (Est), standard error of the mean (SEM) and P-value1147
of each factor. The intercept of the GLMM represents a test of subjects’ performance against the chance1148
value. Below each factor the means (M), SEM and P-values of the post-hoc tests (based on the intercept1149
of the GLMM) against the chance value are shown for the different levels of each factor.1150
T1 Success T1 First decision T1 First move
M / Est SEM p M / Est SEM p M / Est SEM p
Intercept 0.99 0.25 <0.001 0.61 0.15 <0.001 0.54 0.18 0.003
LoP -0.16 0.10 0.122 -0.13 0.10 0.207 -0.03 0.10 0.800
0 0.53 0.06 <0.001 0.69 0.03 <0.001 0.64 0.06 0.006
1 0.44 0.07 0.001 0.63 0.06 0.009 0.63 0.07 0.003
2 0.44 0.07 0.002 0.63 0.05 0.006 0.63 0.04 0.027
CiD -0.43 0.11 0.000 -0.11 0.10 0.302 -0.12 0.10 0.256
0 0.56 0.06 <0.001 0.67 0.04 <0.001 0.66 0.05 0.001
1 0.38 0.07 0.024 0.63 0.05 0.006 0.61 0.05 0.043
Age -0.11 0.25 0.663 -0.18 0.15 0.217 -0.25 0.17 0.155
Repetition 0.41 0.11 0.000 0.19 0.10 0.064 0.20 0.10 0.051
1 0.38 0.06 0.028 0.61 0.03 0.052 0.59 0.04 0.069
2 0.56 0.06 <0.001 0.69 0.05 0.001 0.68 0.06 0.001
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Table 5 Exp. 1: Number of trials per configuration of younger subjects (N=9) as a function of level of1152
planning (LoP), change in direction (CiD), age of subjects, and repetition of configurations. In bold the1153
results of the GLMM are presented including the estimates (Est), standard error of the mean (SEM) and1154
P-value of each factor. The intercept of the GLMM represents a test of subjects’ performance against the1155
chance value. Below each factor the means (M), SEM and P-values of the post-hoc tests (based on the1156
intercept of the GLMM) against the chance value are shown for the different levels of each factor.1157
Model terms Number trials
M / Est SEM P
Intercept -0.20 0.17 0.246
LoP 0.06 0.05 0.185
0 2.83 0.39 0.032
1 3.72 0.48 0.754
2 3.29 0.60 0.198
CiD 0.07 0.08 0.440
0 3.11 0.53 0.274
1 3.45 0.52 0.307
Age -0.12 0.12 0.298
Repetition -0.25 0.03 <0.001
1 4.10 0.57 0.882
2 2.46 0.53 0.002
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Table 6 Exp. 2: First trial performance as a function of level of planning (LoP), change in direction (CiD),1159
age of subjects, and repetition of configurations. In bold the results of the GLMM are presented including1160
the estimates (Est), standard error of the mean (SEM) and P-value of each factor. The intercept of the1161
GLMM represents a test of subjects’ performance against the chance value. Below each factor the means1162
(M), SEM and P-values of the post-hoc tests (based on the intercept of the GLMM) against the chance1163
value are shown for the different levels of each factor.1164
Model terms T1 Success T1 First decision
M / Est SEM P M / Est SEM P
Intercept 1.92 0.13 <0.001 0.31 0.11 0.006
LoP -0.27 0.12 0.018 -0.22 0.11 0.054
0 0.55 0.09 <0.001 0.63 0.08 0.003
1 0.53 0.05 <0.001 0.61 0.04 0.000
2 0.40 0.05 <0.001 0.50 0.04 1.000
CiD -0.42 0.12 <0.001 -0.31 0.11 0.008
0 0.71 0.05 <0.001 0.74 0.05 0.000
1 0.41 0.05 <0.001 0.52 0.04 0.589
2 0.44 0.07 <0.001 0.54 0.05 0.419
Age -0.40 0.13 0.002 -0.28 0.11 0.016
Repetition 0.13 0.11 0.252 0.00 0.11 1.000
1 0.46 0.05 <0.001 0.58 0.04 0.049
2 0.52 0.06 <0.001 0.58 0.04 0.041
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Table 7 : Output of GLMM (Est estimates, SEM standard error of the mean, and P-value of each factor.)1167
comparing the T1 first decision performance across Experiment 1 and 2 (Number of traps), level of1168
planning (LoP), age of subjects, and repetition of configurations.1169
Model terms T1 First decision
Est SEM P
Intercept 0.53 0.10 <0.001
Number of traps -0.23 0.08 0.004
LoP -0.17 0.09 0.043
Age -0.30 0.10 0.002
Repetition 0.14 0.08 0.086
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Table 8 Exp. 2: Number of trials per configuration as a function of level of planning (LoP), change in1171
direction (CiD), age of subjects, and repetition of configurations. In bold the results of the GLMM are1172
presented including the estimates (Est), standard error of the mean (SEM) and P-value of each factor.1173
The intercept of the GLMM represents a test of subjects’ performance against the chance value. Below1174
each factor the means (M), SEM and p-values of post-hoc tests (based on the intercept of the GLMM)1175
against the chance value are shown for the different levels of each factor.1176
Model terms Number of trials
M / Est SEM P
Intercept -1.36 0.06 <0.001
LoP 0.14 0.05 <0.001
0 2.04 0.29 <0.001
1 2.21 0.27 <0.001
2 2.90 0.24 <0.001
CiD 0.18 0.05 0.001
0 1.45 0.12 <0.001
1 2.76 0.32 <0.001
2 2.56 0.22 <0.001
Age 0.21 0.05 <0.001
Repetition -0.14 0.04 <0.001
1 2.72 0.31 <0.001
2 2.05 0.23 <0.001
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Table 9 Exp. 3: First trial performance as a function of level of planning (LoP), change in direction (CiD),1178
age of subjects, and repetition of configurations. In bold the results of the GLMM are presented including1179
the estimates (Est), standard error of the mean (SEM) and P-value of each factor. The intercept of the1180
GLMM represents a test of subjects’ performance against the chance value. Below each factor the means1181
(M), SEM and p-values of the post-hoc tests (based on the intercept of the GLMM) against the chance1182
value are shown for the different levels of each factor.1183
1184
Model terms T1 Success T1 First decision
M / Est SEM P M / Est SEM P
Intercept 1.85 0.52 <0.001 0.97 0.31 0.001
LoP -0.69 0.11 <0.001 -0.72 0.11 <0.001
0 0.84 0.03 <0.001 0.88 0.02 <0.001
1 0.67 0.03 0.007 0.73 0.03 0.001
2 0.54 0.03 <0.001 0.58 0.03 0.110
CiD -0.07 0.11 0.494 -0.06 0.11 0.597
0 0.69 0.03 0.003 0.73 0.02 <0.001
1 0.67 0.03 <0.001 0.72 0.03 0.008
Age 0.34 0.13 0.007 0.26 0.12 0.025
4 y 0.62 0.03 <0.001 0.68 0.03 <0.001
5 y 0.74 0.03 <0.001 0.77 0.03 <0.001
Repetition 0.50 0.07 <0.001 0.35 0.07 <0.001
1 0.59 0.03 <0.001 0.67 0.02 0.001
2 0.77 0.03 <0.001 0.78 0.03 <0.001
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Table 10 Exp 3: T1 first decision performance of 4- and 5-year-old children is presented. M mean, SEM1186
standard error of the mean, P-value of post-hoc tests (based on the intercept of the GLMM) against the1187
chance value.1188
4-year-olds 5-year-olds
M SEM P M SEM P
LoP 0 0.84 0.03 <0.001 0.91 0.03 <0.001
1 0.65 0.04 0.001 0.80 0.04 <0.001
2 0.55 0.04 0.267 0.60 0.04 0.187
CiD 0 0.69 0.03 <0.001 0.78 0.03 <0.001
1 0.68 0.04 <0.001 0.76 0.03 0.004
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Table 11 Exp. 3: Number of trials per configuration as a function of level of planning (LoP), change in1190
direction (CiD), age of subjects, and repetition of configurations. In bold the results of the GLMM are1191
presented including the estimates (Est), standard error of the mean (SEM) and P-value of each factor.1192
The intercept of the GLMM represents a test of subjects’ performance against the chance value. Below1193
each factor the means (M), SEM and p-values of the post-hoc tests (based on the intercept of the GLMM)1194
against the chance value are shown for the different levels of each factor.1195
1196
Model terms Number of trials
M / Est SEM P
Intercept -0.94 0.05 <0.001
LoP 0.10 0.03 0.001
0 1.38 0.09 <0.001
1 1.54 0.08 <0.001
2 1.75 0.08 <0.001
CiD 0.03 0.03 0.320
0 1.51 0.07 <0.001
1 1.60 0.09 <0.001
Age -0.08 0.04 0.042
4 y 1.68 0.10 <0.001
5 y 1.44 0.08 <0.001
Repetition -0.18 0.02 <0.001
1 1.84 0.11 <0.001
2 1.28 0.04 <0.001
1197
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Fig.1 Illustration of an ape working on the maze apparatus. The reward is shown in the starting1199
position on the uppermost level. The subjects could move the reward via the slits in the front1200
side of the apparatus. The shown trap configuration is an example of level of planning (LoP) 11201
and changes in direction (CiD) 1. The openings in the backside of the apparatus that allowed1202
baiting and entering/removing the yellow trap elements are not depicted here for the sake of1203
convenience.1204
1205
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1206
Fig. 2 Examples of different trap configurations employed in the current study according to their1207
level of planning (LoP) and changes in direction (CiD). a LoP 0, CiD 0; b LoP 1, CiD 1; c LoP 2,1208
CiD 11209
1210
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1211
Fig.3 Exp. 1: Trial 1 success as a function of age and species1212
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1214
Fig.4 Exp. 2: Trial 1 success as a function of age and species1215
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1217
Fig.5 Trial 1 success as a function of subject groups (younger nonhuman apes, 4-year-old1218
children, and 5-year-old children) and changes in direction (CiD)1219
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1221
Fig.6 First decision in Trial 1 as a function of subject groups (younger nonhuman apes, 4-year-1222
old children, and 5-year-old children) and level of planning (LoP)1223
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